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VALOR I SAT ION
Knowledge valorisation refers to the process of translating academic knowl-
edge to societal beneﬁt. Traditionally, the way to measure the scientiﬁc impact
of research was by counting the number of scientiﬁc publications. However,
it became clear that the number of publications (on its own) is not a good
indicator. In this addendum I try to outline ways to valorise the knowledge
of the results obtained from my research in the past four years.
This thesis applies game-theoretic tools to several well-known problems.
Each chapter considers a speciﬁc problem and contributes to the topic in a dif-
ferent way. A common feature of all chapters is the focus on equilibrium sit-
uations. Recall that a given situation is in equilibrium if no individual player
has an incentive to deviate. Even though the existence of an equilibrium is
desirable as it describes a stable situation, there are three main drawbacks.
First, even if an equilibrium exists, the question is how such equilibrium is
reached. Second, the equilibrium concepts in this thesis are not stable against
deviations by groups of players. One could easily think of situations in which
players cooperate. Think for example of a close brother and sister in the es-
tate division problem, or two colluding ﬁrms in Hotelling’s model. Third, the
concept of a Nash equilibrium seems restrictive. One interpretation of a Nash
equilibrium is to view the proﬁle of (possibly mixed) strategies as the beliefs
that a player holds about the other players’ choices. Such beliefs correspond
to a Nash equilibrium if there is common belief in rationality plus additional
restrictions, like, for example, each player believes that the other players are
correct about the beliefs he holds about the other players’ choices. One could
argue how basic such condition is.
There is a lot of literature on each of these three points, but since they
are not the focus of this thesis let us refrain from going into too much details.
Moreover, despite its shortcomings, the Nash equilibrium has been extremely
important for the development of game theory and provides a good bench-
mark. After all, if we want to investigate whether a speciﬁc social institution
has any weaknesses, it can be very helpful to analyse the institution under the
assumption that individuals are not ﬂawed themselves. Otherwise, we cannot
say whether a potential failure implies a reform of the institution or better
education for the individuals. Thus an argument for reform of social institu-
tions (rather than for education of individuals) is most persuasive when it is
based on a model which assumes that individuals intelligently understand
their environment and rationally act to maximize their own welfare.5
5 For a more extensive argument, see Myerson (1999).
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Let me now return to the question of societal impact. How can the results
of this thesis be used to affect our society?
One answer is that the models explain real-life phenomena. For example,
the motivation for the research in Chapter 3 comes from an observation in
every day life. A typical Dutch lunch consists of sandwiches. Just outside
the School of Business and Economics, there are two neighbouring sandwich
shops. Why did these two ﬁrms decide to locate next to each other?
One explanation is Hotelling’s law. Firms have an incentive to locate close
together in order to minimize product differentiation. This observation does
not only apply to businesses (think of burger chains, gas stations), but also to
political candidates. The assumption underlying this result is that consumers
choose a product that is closed to them. Even though the model is very sim-
plistic, it might capture parts of the motivation of a ﬁrm.
However, in many situations consumers are also impatient. If a person is
hungry and walks towards these two sandwich shops and sees a long queue
at one of them, then he decides to choose the other one. So for multiple
applications, it is reasonable to assume that waiting time is also important.
From our results, it actually turns out that there are equilibria in which two
ﬁrms choose the same location. Hence the behaviour of the two sandwich
shops is rational according to our model.
A second answer is to give people room for thought. Consider the situation
in which a ﬁrm goes bankrupt. It has to be decided on a fair division of
the liquidation value among the creditors. In the last two decades a lot of
appealing properties for division rules for this problem have been proposed.
Then given a speciﬁc situation, you could use the appropriate properties to
compare several division rules and choose the rule that suits the situation
best.
In the Netherlands the bankruptcy of a ﬁrm is arranged by law. The pro-
cedure works as follows. Basically, there is an order of priority according to
which creditors get there money back. The highest priority applies to costs
related to the bankruptcy, for example the salary of the executor. The second
highest priority applies to the taxes, social charges and remaining salary pay-
ments of employees. The third priority applies to the remaining creditors. On
average these creditors only receive 4% of their total.
It is clear from above procedure that in many cases only the executor and
the government receives money. It is possible to think of other fair ways of
distributing the money such that other creditors receive a larger amount of
their total by using some of the properties that are proposed in the literature.
The third and hopefully most appealing answer is that results can be used
by companies. As an illustration, consider trafﬁc networks. A user in a trafﬁc
network only cares about his own travel time. The fact that this could imply
additional waiting time for other users is irrelevant for his own choice. So
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trafﬁc participants seem to be a good example of rational players that act
selﬁshly.
Analysing such network routing games has lead to insightful observations.
One of the most famous results, a phenomena that actually has been observed
in several cities over the world, is called Braess’s paradox. Simply said, the
result states that closing down a road might improve the performance in
the network. The reason for this is the selﬁsh choice of new routes can be
beneﬁcial overall. This result can be applied in the design of a trafﬁc network,
both during construction and for the end result.
Despite the dynamic nature of trafﬁc networks, many models and corre-
sponding results are obtained in static frameworks. The justiﬁcation for this
is that the static game represents the steady state of a dynamic model. Re-
cently, more people focus on dynamic congestion games, which are able to
capture phenomena like periodicity of trafﬁc ﬂows. Think of daily trafﬁc
jams during rush hours. This has lead to new insights compared to the static
setting. Our paper Scarsini, Schröder, and Tomala (2015) focusses on this pe-
riodic behaviour to ﬁnd the additional delay due to periodicity. But how can
we use all these insights?
We live in a world full of modern technology. One of the (many) implica-
tions is that many trafﬁc users make use of GPS navigation. This implies that
a lot of information is available on the location and the delays incurred by
these users, which can be used for the navigation of other users.
The Consumer Association is an organisation that stands up for the inter-
ests of the Dutch consumers. Recently, they tested the quality of several well-
known navigation systems.6 Their tests showed that in at least one thirds of
all test drives the information provided was inaccurate. This means that there
is room for improvement.
Problems one could think of are the following. First of all, the informa-
tion provision should be fast and accurate. Delays are very dynamic, so it is
important to have an idea how the delay evolves over time.
Second, the problem that has to be considered is very complex and is difﬁ-
cult to compute. There are lots of users and each one of them has a different
destination. So it is complicated to determine alternative routes such that
each user has an incentive to choose the indicated route. Think of a situation
in which people try to avoid a trafﬁc jam by using a small side road that
then also becomes congested. If a user believes he is better off by choosing a
different route, the redirection has no purpose.
Third, companies should have an incentive to work together. Globally speak-
ing, the best results can be obtained, the more information is available. This
can only be achieved if companies are willing to cooperate. Unfortunately,
each company has an incentive to keep its information private in order to
gain a competitive advantage.
6 See http://www.consumentenbond.nl/tests/bestanden/
elektronica-communicatie/201502p56_Test_ navigatiesystemen.pdf
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Our models provide insights and techniques that can be used in order to
deal with some of the above problems. The fact that there are quite some
hurdles to take only proves that there is still a lot of work to be done.
